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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
In refusing to give the earlier decision res judicata effect, the
court was restating the settled law in New York: "Res judicata
effect is not given to a legal proceeding unless there has been a
final judgment." 229
The dissent, while agreeing that the doctrine of res judicata
does not generally apply in the absence of the entry of a final judg-
ment, would have been willing to endorse an exception to the rule
making a decision or verdict binding because of the parties'
acquiescence to it. 2 0 The dissent felt that an exception should be
allowed in the instant case, especially in light of the recent prag-
matic approach to the doctrine of res judicata by the Court of
Appeals. 12 1
Where, as in the instant case, the issues have been previously
litigated, and only the ministerial function of entering judgment
remains, it seems that there is little to be gained from a technical
application of res judicata principles.1 22  Not only is the refusal
to afford a res judicata defense unfair to the defendant, but the
liberal spirit of recent Court of Appeals decisions in the area12 3
is circumvented.
Res judicata: Principle applies even where prior court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is the power of a court to reach and affect legal
interests.124  Before a court may effectively render a judgment, it
must have jurisdiction over the persons or things in-
volved, as well as subject matter jurisdiction, i.e., competency
to decide the particular litigation in question. The judgment
of a court proceeding without these two prerequisites is
119 5 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEv YORK CIVn. PRACTICE IT 5011.10
(1966).
120 Mandracchia v. Russo, 53 Misc. 2d 1018, 1020, 280 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432
(App. T. 2d Dep't 1967). In support of this proposition the court cited
Kannel v. Kennedy, 94 F.2d 487 (3d Cir. 1937).
12153 Misc. 2d at 1020, 280 N.Y.S.2d at 432.
122New York recognizes the following exception to the general rule:
"In certain instances the final judgment requirement is ignored. When an
order adjudicating a fully litigated and central motion in the first action
determines the subject matter of the second action and the order was not
subject to modification at a later point in the first suit, it is binding on the
parties in the subsequent suit. Similarly, when an issue is heard before a
referee to hear and report and his report is confirmed by the court, the
referee's determination is given res judicata effect." 5 WEIsTEIxn, KoRN &
MILLER, NEW YORK C=IVI PRACTICE 5011.10 (1966).
123 See, e.g., B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195,
278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967); Cummings v. Dresher, 18 N.Y.2d 105, 218 N.E.
2d 688, 271 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1966).
124 1 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MniER, NEv YORK CrviL PRACnCE ff 301.01
(1966).
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subject to attack either directly or collaterally 1 25 in a subsequent
action even though res judicata would otherwise be a defense.
While this is true as a general rule, if the lack of jurisdiction
is specifically put into issue in the first action, the court's deter-
mination of its own jurisdiction is conclusive. In this case, the
court's finding can be attacked by direct appeal, but not by col-
lateral attack.1 2
6
Friedman v. State ' 27 is an illustration of this proposition. In
Friedman, the claimant, a removed supreme court justice, sought
to recover back salary, contending that the Court on the Judiciary
was incompetent to remove him because it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court of Claims held that while the claim was
ostensibly an action at law for accrued salary, it was, in actuality,
a collateral attack upon the jurisdiction of the Court on the
judiciary. Since Friedman had litigated the issue of that court's
jurisdiction while before it, his proper remedy was by direct appeal
to the Court of Appeals. No direct appeal having been taken,
the doctrine of res judicata precluded an exercise of jurisdiction
by the Court of Claims, thus forcing a dismissal of the claim.
Collateral estoppel: Defensive use of doctrine in derivative
liability case.
The doctrine of mutuality of estoppel provides that since non-
parties and non-privies are not bound by a judgment, normally
they cannot attempt to benefit therefrom . 2  Recent years have
seen a gradual erosion of the doctrine. Frequently, persons who
were not parties or privies to a prior litigation have been per-
mitted to assert the prior judgment as res judicata against an
adversary, even though they would not have been bound had the
prior result been to the contrary.' 29  The original exceptions to
the doctrine of mutuality were found in derivative liability cases
involving suits brought against the absentee owners of automobiles
to recover for the alleged negligence of their operators. 2 0 At
first, these owners, whose liability was derived from their opera-
tor's conduct, were allowed to rely on the doctrine of collateral
estoppel defensively. 13' More recently, the Court of Appeals has
allowed the offensive use of collateral estoppel in these derivative
125 Id. If 301.02.
126 5 id. I 5011.16, 5011.43.
127 53 Misc. 2d 955, 278 N.Y.S.Zd 999 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
12 8 WACHTELL, NEw YORK PRACTICE UxDER THE CPLR 347 (2d ed. 1966).
129See, e.g., Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 118-120, 134
N.E.2d 97, 98-100, 151 N.Y.S2d 1, 3-5 (1956).0 WACHTELL, supra note 128, at 348.
'3'See, e.g., Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9
N.E.2d 758 (1937).
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